On an MSNBC talk show in April 2015, one of the analyst equated the Iran Nuclear framework with President Kennedy’s pursuit of a nuclear test ban treaty with the Soviet Union. The analyst argued that it was Eisenhower’s eventual support that saved the partial Test Ban Treaty, and wondered whether any Republican would step into this role for Obama. In fact two other interrelated factors were much more important. The first was the public and political perceptions of the dangers of nuclear war in the aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis, where the two superpowers just barely avoided calamity. The second was JFK’s ability to manage the process of treaty signing and ratification.
Both Kennedy and Khrushchev were deeply affected by the Cuban missile crisis. During it, Kennedy had told the British ambassador: “A world in which there are large quantities of nuclear weapons is an impossible world to handle. We really must try to get disarmament if we get through this crisis…because this is just too much.” Yuri Zhukov, a close advisor to Khrushchev, had told Averell Harriman that in the aftermath of the crisis that nuclear war was “unthinkable”, and that both sides should work toward “an agreement on nuclear testing.” Public perceptions on the need for a test ban treaty had also shifted in a remarkable way after the crisis. Only 25% of American’s were in support of a test ban in March 1962, but 61% supported such a ban by August 1963.
Despite the support of the two key leaders and eventually a large part of the public in the United States, there were still those who opposed a treaty, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff, many Republican Senators, southern Democrats and the right wing. Most of the opposition focused on the fear that the Soviets would cheat, a refrain that is also heard today over a potential nuclear deal with Iran. Senator Richard Russell was fairly typical in this regard when he said that “those Russians…have never carried out any agreement they’ve made.” Kennedy believed that both he and Khrushchev “occupy approximately the same political positions inside our governments. He would like to prevent a nuclear war but is under severe pressure from his hard line crowd.” One wonders if Obama feels that same way vis-à-vis Iranian President Rouhani. Obama finds himself defending a potential deal from conservatives in Congress, who have gone so far as to send an open letter to the Supreme leader in Iran. Meanwhile, Rouhani may be contending with similar opposition to any deal from Ayatollah Khamenei and other conservative elements in Iran.
In 1963, the objection of many of these groups and of key Senators made a comprehensive test ban treaty, one that included underground testing as well, all but impossible. JFK also maintained that there was a need for far more frequent and intrusive inspections than Khrushchev would accept. This still left the door open for a limited test ban treaty, one that covered atmospheric, underwater and outer space tests, which did not require inspections. Kennedy’s peace speech laid the groundwork for this by showing Khrushchev that he was serious about relaxing tensions with the Soviet Union, of which the Partial Test Ban Treaty would be the first step. It was also an attempt by the President to solidify support for the treaty. It was a speech that needed to be given well before the 1964 election, since the Senate would never approve a treaty of this type during an election year. Obama probably faces similar pressure with the Iran nuclear deal, even though he does not need formal Senate approval.
In the peace speech, which he gave at American University on June 10, 1963, JFK urged the American people to examine their own attitudes towards the Soviet Union. “As Americans we find Communism profoundly repugnant as a negation of personal freedom and dignity. But we can still hail the Russian people for their many achievements…In the final analysis, our most basic common link is that we all inhabit this small planet. We all breathe the same air. We all cherish our children’s future. And we are all mortal.” He also announced that Khrushchev had invited a delegation to Moscow to discuss a test ban treaty, and that in the meantime the United States would stop atmospheric testing. The speech was later considered a landmark in the effort to reduce tensions during the Cold War, although the initial public response was tepid.
In an attempt to build support for the Treaty in the Senate, Kennedy sent a delegation to Russia to accompany Secretary of State Rusk that included five Senators, including two Republicans. Perhaps President Obama should take a page from Kennedy’s book in this regard and consider bringing a limited number of reasonable legislators into closer consultation on the final negotiations. The Iranian nuclear deal, if one is finally reached, won’t require Senate approval under the Constitution, since it will be an executive agreement. Still, the President will need the approval of both houses of Congress to implement any deal, since only the legislative branch can permanently remove the sanctions on Iran. Obama has also agreed to sign the Corker bill that is likely to emerge from the Senate, which requires Congressional review of any final nuclear agreement. Any deal that has the support of the Congress will be stronger in the long run, although the gridlock that marks congressional politics must give Obama a great deal of concern.
Kennedy was also masterful in managing the ratification process. Kennedy knew that opposition to the treaty from the Joint Chiefs would be fatal, and so he agreed to various safeguards, including the continuation of underground testing, as a way to neutralize the opposition of the military to even a limited test ban treaty. The day after a treaty was reached in Moscow, he hit the airwaves to urge the Senate to support this “first step” toward peace. He met privately with wavering Senators and provided a series of assurances to the committee that was reviewing the agreement, which moved Democratic Senator Henry Jackson into a supporter and helped achieve overwhelming support for the Treaty. The President and his staff also organized the presentations that were made before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. One analyst has written that “witnesses were selected with care, their testimony was prepared by administration forces, and the order in which they appeared…was designed to bolster the persuasiveness of the administration’s position.” All of these efforts probably helped to move the public’s position to support for the Treaty.
As for the issue of Eisenhower’s role, it is clear that Kennedy was fearful of his opposition. Michael Beschloss speculates that JFK was able to neutralize Ike’s opposition by agreeing to not prosecute his former chief of staff, Sherman Adams, on corruption charges. In return, Eisenhower removed his opposition to the treaty.
Ultimately, the Partial Test Ban Treaty passed the Senate on an overwhelming vote of 80-19. The historian Robert Dallek argues that “the treaty was so transparently a step in the right direction of better Soviet-American relations and away from the brinksmanship of the Cuban missile crisis that it is difficult to imagine the public and the Senate turning it aside.” But Kennedy’s handling of the ratification process also contributed mightily in setting the stage for the ultimate ratification by such a wide margin. The lesson for President Obama may be that if a nuclear deal with Iran is to ultimately succeed, he needs to work tirelessly over the coming months to build public and Congressional support. As Richard Neustadt once wrote, the real power of the presidency is the power to persuade.
Sources:
- Berkowitz, Morton, Bock, P.G., Fuccillo, Vincent J, The Politics of American Foreign Policy, (Englewood Cliffs, 1977)
- Beschloss, Michael R., The Crisis Years: Kennedy and Khrushchev 1960-1963, (New York, 1991)
- Dallek, Robert, An Unfinished Life: John F. Kennedy 1917-1963, (New York, 2003)
- Reeves, Richard, President Kennedy: Profile of Power, (New York, 1993)
- Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr., A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House, (Boston, 1965)